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LINCOLN CONSPIRACY TRIAL AND MILITARY
JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
It is worth remarking that as the Constitution
is deemed to proceed from the People who enacted
it, not from the Convention who drafted it, it is
regarded for the purposes of interpretation as be-
ing the work not of a group of lawyers but of the
people themselves.
-Bryce, The American Commonwealth.
INTRODUCTION
In the trial of the Lincoln conspirators, a most illustra-
tive example of civilians being tried by a military commis-
sion, one of the counsel, referring to the matter of juris-
diction, said: "That question, in all courts, civil, criminal,
military, must be considered and answered affirmatively be-
fore judgment can be pronounced." ' The issue arises when
a civilian is brought before a court-martial or military com-
mission for trial without a jury, instead of before the or-
dinary civil courts, which are open at the time. The court-
martial or military commission may be established by virtue
of a statute, as exemplified in the Articles of War,2 enacted
by Congress; or it may arise as an incident of the common-
law of war, as for example, the military commission con-
voked in 1847 by General Scott to try civilians in Mexico.
This article will consider the jurisdiction assumed by
courts-martial or military commissions to try and to sen-
tence civilians when the regular courts are open. As the
trial of the Lincoln conspirators involved this question, spe-
cial reference will be made to it.
I The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators.
Compiled and arranged by Benn Pitman, Recorder to the Commission. Publishers:
Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin, Cincinnati and New York, 1865. Speech of Mr.
Reverdy Johnson. See Myths After Lincoln by Lloyd Lewis, 1929, Harcourt,
Brace & Co.
2 June 4, 1920, c. 227, subchapter 11, 1, 41 Stat. 787. 10 USCA, Ch. 36.
MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
The civilian claims that the court-martial or military
commission has no jurisdiction, as it is not a court within
the meaning of Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution; and he
further contends that such tribunal deprives one of a right
to a trial by jury as provided by Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3,
and ignores the safeguards surrounding it, which were es-
tablished by the fifth and sixth amendments. The militari-
cian claims that the military tribunal has jurisdiction over
civilians by virtue of the "war power," even though the
civil courts are open, as the right to a trial by jury and to
other civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is
suspended in time of war. He cites the maxim, "Inter arma
silent leges." In answer to that school of thought another
maxim is cited, "Sunt et belli sicut et pacis jura." It is fur-
ther shown that the basic principle of government under
the Constitution is that the civil power is supreme at all
times; and, in the language of ex-President John Adams,
"Nothing is more essential than to hold the civil authorities
decidedly superior to the military power." I It is then added
that the exercise of the "war power" does not suspend the
operation of the provision relating to trial by jury nor any
of the provisions found in the Bill of Rights, as these were
inserted to protect the fundamental liberties, which history
had shown were endangered by an exercise of military pow-
er..As Justice Field said in the Milligan case, "Not one of
these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the
Judiciary disturb except the one concerning the writ of
habeas corpus." 1
1066- 1860
A brief examination will be made of the historical devel-
opment as shown in the leading cases and opinions to af-
ford a proper perspective for determining the line of de-
marcation between military and common law trials of civil-
3 Works of John Adams, Vol. 10, p. 17.
4 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866). See "Military Law
and War-Time Legislation," 1919, Preface by Colonel John H. Wigmore, and pp.
158, 681, 729, 820.
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ians in time of war when the ordinary courts are open and
functioning.
In Hale's History of the Common Law,5 it is stated, in
referring to the jurisdiction over civilians in time of martial
law:
"That this indulged law is only to extend to members of the army,
or to those of the opposed army, and never was so much indulged as
intended to be executed or exercised upon others, for others who had
not listed under the army had no color or reason to be bound by mili-
tary constitutions applicable to the army whereof they were not parts,
but they were to be ordered and governed according to the laws to
which they were subject although it were a time of war."
Again, in his classic on criminal law, Hale states, "That reg-
ularly when the King's courts are open it is a time of peace
in judgment of law." 6 These quotations indicate the tend-
ency of the early common law to clearly define the limita-
tions of military jurisdiction over civilians. Likewise Magna
Charta and Petition of Right exemplify the same doctrine.
In Forsyth's valuable collection of cases is found an opin-
ion rendered by eminent Mr. Hargrave relating to an Irish
trial in which a military commission tried a civilian and
pronounced the sentence of death while the regular courts
were open. Mr. Hargrave said:
"He saw the right of putting rebels to death in battle while the battle
lasted. He also saw the right to arrest those found in actual rebellion
or duly charged with being traitors, and to have them imprisoned for
trial and punishment according to the law of treason. But he could
not see that trying and punishing rebels according to martial law was,
when Mr. Grogan was tried and put to death, part of the English law
as it was administrable in England or even as it was administrable in
Ireland. On the contrary he saw such recitals to be irreconcilable with
the Petition of Right and the opinions of Coke.. . Noy ... Rolle
Banks . . . Mason . . . and Hale." 7
5 Ed. 1820 by Runnington, p. 42. See Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically
Considered, 18 L. Q. R. 117.
6 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, Dogherty's Ed. 1800, p. 346.
7 Forsyth's Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law, Stevens & Haynes,
London, 1869, p. 189, 192. At p. 491, in this book, will be found one of the great-
est arguments of Mr. David Dudley Field, on military jurisdiction over civilians:
McCardl6's case, 7 Wall. 506 (1868).
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In Coke's words, "A rebel may be slain in rebellion but if
he be taken he cannot be put to death by martial law." 8
Again, Rolle has said, "The common law is the highest for
the subject .... If a subject be taken in rebellion and be
not slain at the time of his rebellion, he is to be tried after
by the common law." I In Maitland's Constitutional His-
tory are the following remarks on this subject: "But sup-
pose one of the rebels captured, there is no court that can
try him save the ordinary' criminal courts of the country." "0
The preceding historical sources indicate that the spirit as
well as the positive letter of the law upheld the doctrine
that the civilian had a prima facie right to be tried by a
civil court. England is adhering to this doctrine at the
present time and with the exception of some anomalies in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it has strictly fol-
lowed these principles.
In Ireland the famous case of Wolfe Tone involved the
question of military jurisdiction over a civilian in time of
war when the civil courts were open but Tone's rash act
precluded a final decision by the Irish court. Tone left
Ireland and became a French officer. Returning to Ireland
on a French warship, he was arrested by the military au-
thorities and tried by court martial and sentenced to be
hanged. On the day set for his execution his father obtained
counsel, who sued out a writ of habeas corpus and sought
Tone's release on the ground that the great criminal court
of the land was open and therefore the military court was
without jurisdiction. Lord Chief Justice Kilwarden ordered
the writ to issue and likewise ordered the sheriff to proceed
to the barracks and acquaint the provost-marshal that a
writ was being issued and to suspend Tone's execution.
Upon refusal of the military officers to recognize the writ,
the Lord Chief Justice said: "Mr. Sheriff, take the body of
8 Rushworth's Collection, iii, Appendix, 76 to 81.
9 Ibid. See Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule, Chicago, 1930, Callaghan and
Company, p. 1, and p. 245 for extensive Bibliographical Note.
10 p. 492.
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Tone into custody. Take the provost-marshal and Major
Sandys into custody and show the order of the court to
General Craig." 11 "Nothing better illustrates the noble en-
ergy with which judges have maintained the rule of regular
law, even at period of revolutionary violence, than Wolfe
Tone's case." 12
During the Revolutionary War while the civil courts of
New York were open and functioning the military authori-
ties assumed jurisdiction in the following instance: In 1780,
General Washington ordered a court martial to try Joshua
Hett Smith, a civilian for aiding and assisting Benedict Ar-
nold in his treasonable design with Major Andre. Smith ac-
companied Major Andre from the sloop of war Vulture
and entertained him as a guest at his home. Upon the arrest
of Major Andre it was found he was wearing a suit of
Smith's clothes. "Smith objected to the legality or propriety
of his being tried by a military tribunal. He conceived him-
self only amenable to the civil authority of the state to
which he belonged, which had established the right of trial
by jury in the constitution then recently established. "I was
answered by the court," he says in his narrative, "that I was
tried by a resolve of congress, passed in the year 1777, au-
thorizing the commander-in-chief of the army, to hear and
try by court martial, any of the citizens of the United States,
who should harbor or secrete any of the subjects or soldiers
of the king of Great Britain, knowing them to be such, or
should be instrumental in conveying intelligence to the ene-
my, and, if found guilty, should be condemned and executed
as a traitor, assassin and spy. To this I objected .... it made
the military paramount to the civil authority, and would
11 27 State Trials (Howell's Ed., London 1820), 614 at 625. Cf. Ex parte
McArdle, 7 Wall. 506 (1868), and see Field's argument in behalf of McArdle,
op. cit. supra note 7.
12 Dicey's Law of the Constitution, 8th Ed., London 1915, p. 289. Dicey
concluded, on p. 290, as follows: "When it is remembered that Wolfe Tone's
substantial guilt was admitted, that the Court was made up of judges who
detested the rebels, and that in 1798 Ireland was in the midst of a revoluntionary
crisis, it will be admitted that no more splendid assertion of the suoremacy of
the law can be found than the protection of Wolfe Tone by the Irish Bench."
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establish if the court were to proceed on my trial, a prece-
dent dangerous to the liberties of the subject; that it would
excite eventually the indignation of my fellow citizens, in
destroying one of the established principles of liberty belong-
ing to the subject, and the violation of the right to trial by
jury, one of the principal reasons assigned by congress for
their separation from Great Britain, in the Declaration of
Independence, as well as allowing the military an extent
of power incompatible with a free government." "8 The
Court martial ignored Smith's argument. This is one of the
earliest American precedents following the Declaration of
Independence in which the military authorities ignored the
demand of a jury trial in the civil courts and proceeded*
against a civilian with a court martial. In considering the
value of its authority it must be noted that this proceeding
occurred before the adoption of the constitution. Another
important case which involved the right to try civilians with-
out a jury arose in Rhode Island in 1786. A depression fol-
lowed in the wake of the Revolutionary War and an idea
became prevalent that paper money might be a way out;
so the legislature of Rhode Island passed a law declaring
paper money legal tender in lieu of gold or silver. Under
the banking act it was declared a crime for any merchant
to refuse to accept the paper money and one was subject
to arrest and trial before a special court without a jury
for violating the act. Wheeden, a butcher, refused to ac-
cept the paper money in payment of a bill of supplies and
was arrested for violating the law; but much to the surprise
of the executive and legislature, the Judges dismissed the
complaint. The legislature thereupon sought to impeach the
judges for attempting to interfere with the power of the
legislature. Trevett against Wheenden " is one of the best
contemporary expositions upholding the right to trial by jury
13 2 Chandler's Criminal Trials 185 at 187. New York sought to prosecute
Smith as a result of these charges but he fled to England.
14 2 ibid., 267. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U. S. 1 (1898) (As-
pects of Jury Trial).
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and denying the right of jurisdiction in special courts to
try summarily. The proceedings against the Rhode Island
Judges "5 for dismissing the complaint in the above case
contains an exhaustive contemporary analysis of the rela-
tion between the legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
ments, and sustains the right of judicial review. Although
military jurisdiction was not involved in these early Rhode
Island decisions there were questions akin to those arising
in a conflict between the military and civil power. Did the
legislative department in time of emergency have power to
suspend the right to a trial by jury and create special tribu-
nals for the trial of crimes although the ordinary courts
were open at the time? As a military trial is merely one by
a special court without a jury there is much argumentative
material in this 1786 record, which can be used in 1933 for
the purpose of comparative analysis.
The Trials of the Western Insurgents gives a sidelight on
the relation between the civil and military powers that
arose out of the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania.
When General Washington decided to use the militia to
curb the rebellion he had Alexander Hamilton, who was at
Bedford with him, send a letter of instructions to Governor
Lee under date of October 20th, 1794. The letter stated:
"Of those persons in arms, if any, whom you may make
prisoners; leaders, including all persons in command, are
to be delivered to the civil magistrate. . . ." Further, it said:
"You are to exert yourself by all possible means, to pre--
serve discipline among the troops, particularly a scrupulous
regard to the rights of persons and property, and a respect
for the authority of the civil magistrates, taking especial
care to inculcate, and cause to be observed this principle,
that the duties of the army are confined to the attacking
and subduing of armed opponents of the laws, and to the
supporting and aiding of the civil officers in the execution
15 Ibid. See 12 Cal. Law Rev. 75, 85, as to the effect of Constitution on
previous law.
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of their functions." 11 General Washington in this instance
had the Judge of the District, Richard Peters, and the At-
torney of the District, William Rawle, accompany the army.
Such practice made the civil power supreme. If the mili-
tary commander claims jurisdiction the well known incident
in which General Jackson was involved evidences the com-
plications that may arise. After the battle of New Orleans,
but before official knowledge that the treaty of peace had
been signed, General Jackson exercised the military juris-
diction which he assumed upon the declaration of martial
law at the outset. As the war was over, a Mr. Louiallier pub-
lished a denunciatory newspaper article, and General Jack-
son arrested him. Mr. Morel, a lawyer, had United States
Judge Hall issue a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of Mr.
Louiallier. General Jackson arrested the lawyer and the
judge. Mr. Hollander said, in effect, that such conduct was
terrible, and General Jackson arrested him. When the mar-
shal attempted to serve the writ of habeas corpus, General
Jackson took it from him and he returned with a copy.
When peace was restored, Judge Hall returned to his bench
and fined General Jackson one thousand dollars; and the
General paid it."
In Martin v. Mott 1I a militia-man refused to obey the
order of the President calling forth the militia, for which
delinquency he was tried by a court-martial and fined
$96.00. It was contended that Congress could not confide
such power in the President by legislative act and that the
President had no power to decide whether the exigency
justified calling forth the militia; but Mr. Justice Story said
in his opinion, "We are all of the opinion that the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclu-
sively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive
upon all other persons." This leads into a consideration of
16 Wharton's State Trials, Philadelphia 1849, pp. 159, 160.
17 Thirty years later Congress passed an Act which refunded the amount
paid with interest. Bassett's Life of Andrew Jackson.
18 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 19, 6 L. ed. 537 (1827).
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the matter of political questions and the principle that politi-
cal questions are for the executive department to decide
and not the courts.19 Whether the United States recognizes
Russia or whether a state of war exists is said to be a matter
for the political department of the government to decide.
Usually the judicial department has been reluctant to in-
terfere in political questions;2 ° but in an Irish case it was
stated: "A somewhat startling argument was addressed to
us by Mr. Serjeant Hanna, that it was not competent for
this court to decide whether a state of war existed or not,
and that we were bound to accept the statement of Sir Nevil
Macready in this respect as binding upon the court. This
contention is absolutely opposed to our judgment in Allen's
Case (1921) 2 I. R. 241, and is destitute of authority and
we desire to state, in the clearest possible language, that
this Court has the power and duty to decide whether a
state of war exists which justifies the application of martial
law." 21 A case that arose in Bombay in 1830 pointed out
that as long as the military authorities were assuming juris-
diction the civil courts would not undertake to act. In that
case 22 a military officer was sued for seizing treasure at
Poonah while the civil courts were open, and the Bombay
court held that the officer was liable. On appeal, that opin-
ion was reversed. The court said it was a time of war and,
even though the civil courts were open, the military authori-
ties were not subject to its jurisdiction. The peculiar thing
that must be remembered about that case of 1830 is that it
19 See Weston, "Political Questions," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925); Field,
"The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8 Minn. L. Rev.
485 (1924). In Sterling v. Constantin, 53 Sup. Ct. 116 (1932), the question was
considered as to whether the facts justified Governor Sterling issuing a proclama-
tion and declaring martial law in the oil fields of Eastern Texas. Cf. U. S. v.
Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (1920), and note in 34 Harv. L. Rev. 659, "Trial of Civil-
ians by Military Courts."
20 Martin v. Mott, op. cit. supra note 18; Luther v. Borden, 48 U. S. 1,
12 L. ed. 581 (1849); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 53 L.
ed. 410 (1909). See Fletcher, "The Civilian and War Power," 2 Minn. L. Rev.
110 (1918).
21 R. (Garde) v. Strickland, [19211 2 I. R. 317, 329. See Bruce, "The Oil
Situation and the Military," 17 A. B. A. Journal 643 (1931).
22 Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, 1 Knapp, P. C. 316 (1830).
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involved an action for damages and not the question wheth-
er military authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over civil-
ians in time of war when the civil courts are open. Yet, in
1902,23 when a real issue arose as to military jurisdiction
over civilians this 1830 damage case was used as controlling
authority for the view that the military jurisdiction was
supreme. There are other views, and this problem should
also be considered in the light of the following opinion sent
to the Governor of Canada in 1838 by the Attorney General
and Solicitor General of England: "When the regular courts
are open, so that criminals might be delivered over to them
to be dealt with according to law, there is not, as we con-
ceive, any right in the Crown to adopt any other course of
proceeding." 24 In general that statement is likewise appli-
cable to the United States and up until 1860 all doubt was
resolved in favor of its soundness.
1860 -7 1933
Until 1860 in the United States a balance had generally
been struck between the essentials of a stable society and
the civil liberties of the individual.25 It always had been cus-
tomary to recognize the constitutional guaranties of jury
trial; and, as a matter of practice, civilians were immune
23 Ex parte Marais, [1902] A. C. 109. Marais was arrested on August 15,
1901, by the chief constable of Paarl, about thirty-five miles from Cape Town,
who acted under instructions from the military authorities. See Tilonko v. Atty.
Gen. of Natal, [1907] A. C. 93.
24 Forsyth's Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law. op. cit. supra note 7,
at p. 198. Professor John Meehan, a fellow member of the faculty, called my at-
tention to the following statement in The Constitutional Review, Vol. XIII,
April 1929, p. 81, in an article by Professor Robert Rankin: ". . . The fact that
the courts are open has great weight, but the real test is the method with which
the civil courts exercise their jurisdiction." Cf. Dicey's Constitution, op. cit. supra
note 12, at p. 544.
25 Whiting, "War Powers of the President," Boston, 1862, p. 124, states:
"All judicial convictions must be in accordance with the laws establishing the
judiciary and regulating its proceedings. Whenever a person accused of crime
is held by the government, not as a belligerent or prisoner of war, but merely as
a citizen of the United States, then he, is amenable to. and must be tried under
and by virtue of, standing laws; and all rights guaranteed to other citizens in his
condition must be conceded to him." Stacy's case, in 10 John. 328 (1813), is
one of the well-known cases illustrating an earlier contemporaneous view. One
of the most eminent judges that ever graced the bench, Kent, Ch. J. said: "This
is a case which concerns the personal liberty of the citizen. Stacy is now suffer-
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from military trials if the ordinary courts were open. But
amidst the hysteria of political and civil war the civil liber-
ties of the individual were ignored; and wholesale arrests
of citizens by military order and subsequent trials by mili-
tary commissions were common. Sometimes there would be
no trial, as in the case of Madison Y. Johnson v. J. Russell
Jones,2 which is typical of the times. Johnson, an eminent
lawyer of Galena, Illinois, was suspected of not being in
sympathy with the government and was arrested and
brought to Chicago, where he was kept for a few days. He
was then transferred to Fort Delaware and kept in prison
for three months. Then he was set at liberty without trial
or examination or any offense being charged against him.
Johnson then sought to recover damages for false arrest
and imprisonment, and won his case. In 1861 John Merry-
man 27 was aroused from his bed at two o'clock in the morn-
ing, arrested by military order, and taken to Fort McHenry
near Baltimore. It was claimed Merryman was not support-
ing the rigor of confinement in close custody, at this unhealthy season of the
year, at a military camp, and under military power. He is a natural born citizen
residing in this state. He has a numerous family depending upon him for their
support. He is in bad health, and the danger of a protracted confinement to his
health, if not to his life, must be serious. The pretended charge of treason (for
upon the facts before us we must consider it as a pretext), without being founded
upon oath, and without any specification of the matters of which it might con-
sist, and without any color of authority in any military tribunal to try a citizen
for that crime, is only aggravation of the oppression of the confinement. It is
the indispensable duty of this court, and one to which every inferior considera-
tion must be sacrificed, to act as a faithful guardian of the personal liberty of
the citizen, and to give ready and effectual aid to the means provided by law
for its security." A petition of habeas corpus had been ordered to issue in Stacy's
behalf. The court ordered an attachment against General Lewis for a contempt
in case he did not discharge the prisoner forthwith.
26 44 Ill. 142 (1867). In an important case, Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257
at 265, decided in 1815, a civilian sued a military officer for false imprisonment.
The officer set up the defense that Shaw was a spy in the War of 1812, but the
military arrest was not upheld. Ch. J. Johnson, who subsequently became a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said in the opinion: "None
of the offenses charged against Shaw were cognizable by a court-martial, except
which related to his being a spy; and if he was an American citizen he could
not be charged with such an offense. He might be amenable to the civil authority
for treason, but could not be punished under martial law as a spy."
27 Ex parte Merryman, Taney 246, Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861). (Professors
McCabe and Rapacz, of the De Paul Law College, furnished many helpful sug-
gestions about the cases of the period between 1860 and 1870.)
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ing the cause of the Union. Chief Justice Taney ordered a
writ of habeas corpus to issue in Merryman's behalf but the
military authorities refused to recognize the order of the
Chief Justice as President Lincoln had given power to sus-
pend the writ. The Chief Justice denied the power and
ordered that an attachment issue against General Cadwal-
ader because he acted in disobedience of the writ. When the
attaching order was attempted to be served at Fort Mc-
Henry by the United States marshal he was ignored at the
gate by the military authorities. Merryman was still in cus-
tody. In 1863 Clement L. Vallandingham, one of the leaders
of the copperheads, was arrested by order of General Burn-
side; and President Lincoln said: "This arrest was made be-
cause he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the rais-
ing of troops; to encourage desertions from the army; and to
leave the rebellion without an adequate force to suppress
it.... he was damaging the army upon the existence and
vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was war-
ring upon the military and this gave the military constitu-
tional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him." 28 A writ of
habeas corpus sought by Vallandingham was refused by
Judge Leavitt in the United States Circuit Court at Cin-
cinnati because he said he was bound by a prior decision
rendered in October, 1862, by Judge Swayne in which he
concurred. This decision held that if the prisoner was under
military jurisdiction the civil courts would not grant habeas
corpus. Vallandingham, after his trial by the military com-
mission, sought a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court
of the United States but it was denied on the ground that
the court did not have original jurisdiction in such a case
under the constitution.29 Instead of seeking a writ of cer-
28 President Lincoln's Views-An Important Letter on the Principles In-
volved in the Vallandingham Case. (Pamphlet) Philadelphia, 1863. King &
Baird, Sansom Street, pp. 12, 13; Nicolay and Hay, VIII, p. 298.
29 Ex parte Vallandingham, 1 Wall. 243 (1864). In a volume by James G.
Randall, "Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln," published by Appleton &
Company, New York, 1926, at p. 46, referring to President Lincoln, it states:
"In the case of Vallandingham, for instance, there is good evidence that he would
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tiorari, Vallandingham should have appealed from the rul-
ing of Judge Leavitt, who denied the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The answer of the Supreme Court that it
had no jurisdiction in this case still left the question of the
military jurisdiction over civilians unsettled in 1864. In
1865 the trials of the Lincoln conspirators before a military
commission ordered by President Johnson still left the ques-
tion as much of a riddle as ever. But in 1866 the Supreme
Court's decision in the Milligan case solved the question to
some extent. "During the rebellion, one Milligan, a citizen
of the United States and resident of Indiana, who was nei-
ther a prisoner of war nor in the military service of the
United States, was arrested at his home by order of Gen-
eral Hovey, brought before a military commission, tried,
and sentenced to be hanged. On petition for habeas corpus,
the judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion but
the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the court knew
judicially that the authority of the United States was un-
opposed, and its courts were open in Indiana, the military
commission had no jurisdiction of the case." 10 This land-
mark decision would have alleviated much misunderstand-
not have sanctioned the original order for the arrest had the matter been re-
ferred to him." Is Dr. Randall's statement correct? President Lincoln knew all
about the military arrest of Vallandingham and in his letter of June 12, 1863, to
the New York Democrats, said: "And yet, let me say that, in my own discretion,
I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandingham.
While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule,
the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular
case. Of course I must practice a general directory and revisory power in the
matter.
"One of the resolutions expresses the opinion of the meeting that arbitrary
arrests will have the effect to divide and distract those who should be united in
suppressing the rebellion, and I am specifically called on to discharge Mr. Valland-
ingham. I regard this at least a fair appeal to me on the expediency of exercising
a constitutional power which I think exists. In response to such appeal, I have
to say it gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandingham had been ar-
rested that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity
for arresting him, and that it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so
soon as I can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by it."
This quotation is from the letter referred to in note 28 supra, at p. 16.
30 Ex parte MUlligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866). The statement used is that of Justice
Holmes, from the Holmes' edition (12th) of Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 1, p. 341,
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1873. Glenn, "Army and the Law" (1918)
attempts to explain away the value of the Milligan case on punitive theory.
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ing of the extent of the military power to try civilians, if
it had been handed down before the War of the Rebellion,
instead of in 1866.31 Up to the present time the law of this
case has not been changed in the United States.
The decision of the Supreme Court in 1866 exposed the
unsoundness of some of Attorney General Speed's views 32
in regard to the legality of trying civilians by military com-
mission, and supported the statement of the law given to
the Governor of Canada by the English Law Officer in 1838,
that, "When the regular courts are open, so that criminals
might be delivered over to them to be dealt with according
to law, there is not, as we conceive, any right in the Crown
to adopt any other course of proceeding." 11 The 1838 opin-
ion was a restatement of the law by representatives of
the Crown and the 1866 decision was a restatement of the
law by the highest judicial body in the United States, and
in principle they accord. A reasonable view would demand
recognition of the soundness of the doctrine enunciated.
When you further consider the views of President Lincoln
on this matter, as stated in his letter of June 12, 1863, to
the Democrats at Albany, it is evident that his views were
in some respects too broad in reference to military trials of
civilians. President Lincoln said:
"But the meeting [at Albany], by their resolutions, assert and
argue that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them,
for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think
they are not. The resolutions quote from the Constitution the defini-
31 Burgess, "Civil War & Constitution," New York 1901, Chas. Scribner &
Sons, Vol. 2, Ch. XXVIII, pp. 218-219, states: "There is no question that the
practices of the Administration and the opinion of the Court were at variance,
and there is little doubt that in spite of the opinion of the Court the practices
of the Administration would be repeated under like circumstances." This pes-
simistic prediction has not been fulfilled and the experiences of the World War
indicate that Espionage Acts provide ample means to cope with any grave sit-
uation even under circumstances similar to 1863. See "The Executive Power in
the United States," by De Chambrun, 1874, Lancaster, Pa., p. 135, for a critical
analysis of the Milligan case; p. 236 for an interpretation of what the executive
power became under President Lincoln.
32 Trial of the Conspirators, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 403. See Cushing,
VIII, Opin. Atty. Gen'l, p. 369, as to domestic martial law, etc.
as Forsyth, op. dt. supra note 24.
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tion of treason, and also the limiting safeguards and guarantees therein
provided for the citizen on trial for treason, and on his being held to
answer for capital or otherwise infamous crimes, and, in criminal pros-
ecutions, his rights to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury
. . . but these provisions of the Constitution have no application to the
case we have in hand [.Vallandingham case] because the arrests com-
plained of were not made for treason-that is not for tke treason de-
fined in the Constitution, and upon conviction of which the punishment
is death-nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for capital
or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings following, in
any constitutional or legal sense, 'criminal prosecutions.' The arrests
were made on totally different grounds, and the proceedings following
accorded with the grounds of the arrests ... 34
"By the third resolution, the meeting indicates their opinion that
military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actu-
ally exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where
rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist that such
arrests shall not be made, 'outside the lines of necessary military oc-
cupation, and the scenes of insurrection.' Inasmuch, however, as the
Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe
that there is any such constitutional distinction." 35
The Milligan case, however, held that there was such a dis-
tinction; and to that extent the views of President Lincoln
were not recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Vallandingham in. 1863 and Milligan in 1865 were
both arrested for warring on the military or military crimes.
The Lincoln conspirators were likewise arrested and tried
in 1865 for military crimes and four of them were executed
at the Arsenal in Washington, D. C.36 Milligan was sen-
tenced to be hanged,37 but the decision of the Supreme Court
in 1866 exposed the illegality of the military trial and re-
sulted in his being set free. In Ex parte Marais" a civilian
was arrested for contravening Martial Law Regulations in
a district which showed no visible signs of disorder and
where the civil courts were open. In petitioning for his re-
34 President Lincoln's Views, op. cit. supra note 28, at pp. 7, 8. See Chafee,
"Freedom of Speech," 1920, p. 33, as to war power and First Amendment.
35 Ibid. p. 12.
36 The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln by Osborn Oldroyd, Washington,
D. C., p. 205 (View of the scaffold after the trap was sprung).
37 Ex parte Milligan, op. cit. supra note 30, opening statement.
38 [19021 A. C. 109. See note in 15 Harv. Law. Rev. 850 supporting decision.
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lease from the military authorities it was pointed out: "Even
if a state of war did exist, still the application of martial
law was limited by the necessity of preserving peace and or-
der in the district, and did not oust the jurisdiction of those
civil Courts which notwithstanding the pressure of military
circumstances, were still administering the law of the land.
There was no necessity alleged or shown for bringing the
petitioner before a military tribunal whilst a civil Court
was sitting. The right of the Crown to resort to such an
extremity as the proclamation of martial law was limited
by necessity, and, if a civil Court was open, the Crown had
no power to try an offender by a military one." '9 The Privy
Council upheld the refusal of the Cape Colony court to re-
lease the prisoner from the military authorities, and, upon
this matter, which is accompanied with an abundance of
doubt, said:
"The truth is that no doubt has ever existed that where war actu-
ally prevails the ordinary Courts have no jurisdiction over the action
of the military authorities." 40
This decision in 1902 should be weighed with a realization
that it was greatly influenced by Elphinstone v. Bedree-
bhund, which arose in 1830,41 and the following unsettled
presumption about the meaning of the Petition of Right:
"The framers of the Petition of Right knew well what they
meant when they made a condition of peace the ground of
the illegality of unconstitutional procedure." 42 In 1921 the
Irish court was greatly influenced by Ex parte Marais and,
citing it, said: "It is also clear on the authorities that when
martial law is imposed, and the necessity for it exists, or,
in other words, while war is still raging, this court has no
jurisdiction to question any acts done by the military au-
39 Ibid. 110, 111.
40 Ibid. 115.
41 [1830] 1 Knapp P. C. 316.
42 Ex parte Marais, [1902] A. C. 109, at 115. See a very instructive note
on the question of whether the Petition of Right referred to a "time of peace,"
in O'Sullivan, Military Law and the Supremacy of the Civil Courts, London,
1921, published by Stevens and Sons, Ltd., at page 29, footnote x.
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thorities." 4 In the Irish case, John Allen, a civilian, was
arrested by the military authorities and sentenced to death
upon a finding of guilty by a military court.
In Cooley's 1931 edition on Constitutional Law the fact
is apparent that this point about the jurisdiction of the mili-
tary authorities over civilians is still unsettled. It states:
"But whether the Eighty-first Article of War, which provides that,
'whosoever relieves the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money,
or other thing, or holds correspondence with or gives intelligence to
the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other
punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct,'
may be generally enforced against citizens of the United States is an-
other question. These acts would constitute treason and in prosecution
for treason an indictment by the grand jury and a trial by jury are
held to have been provided for in the Constitution. If these acts, how-
ever, were committed in the 'theatre of war,' courts-martial would
probably have jurisdiction." 44
The foundation for the understanding of the issues in-
volved in the Lincoln conspiracy trial, which will now be
considered, has been laid in the examination of the opin-
ions of jurists and contemporaneous cases mentioned above.
Civil War Dates
April 3, 1865, Richmond was taken.
April 9, 1865, General Lee surrendered.
April 14, 1865, President Lincoln was assassinated.
April 16, 1865, Andrew Johnson became President.
April 26, 1865, General Jackson surrendered.
April 27, 1865, Booth, the murderer of President Lincoln
was shot and captured.
May 10, 1865, Jefferson Davis was captured at Irwinville.
May 24, 1865, Grand review of General Sherman's army
at Washington.
43 Rex v. Allen, [1921] 2 I. R. 241. The court in supporting its use of the
word "authorities," cited only Ex parte Marais. See Egan v. Macready, [1921]
1 I. R. 265 for a statement to the effect that Ex parte Marais would not he
applicable where a prisoner was sentenced to death by court-martial.
44 Cooley on Constitutional Law, (4th ed.), (Bruce), 1931, Little, Brown,
and Company, § 18, p. 179.
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May 24, 1865, Jefferson Davis indicted for treason.
May 31, 1865, General Hood and staff surrendered.
Trial of Lincoln Conspirators
May 1, 1865, President Johnson ordered a Military Com-
mission.
May 9, 1865, First Session of the Commission.
June 30, 1865, Findings and sentences of the conspirators
rendered by the Commission.
July 7, 1865, Application of Mary E. Surratt for habeas
corpus filed.
July 7, 1865, Writ of habeas corpus suspended.
July 7, 1865, Execution of four conspirators Herold,
Payne, Atzerodt, Mrs. Mary E. Surratt.
After the assassination of President Lincoln by John
Wilkes Booth, an investigation to discover his accomplices
resulted in the arrest of a number of suspects, including
David E. Herold, Edward Spangler, Mrs. Mary E. Surratt,
George A. Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Dr. Samuel Mudd, Sam-
uel Arnold and Michael O'Laughlin, by the military au-
thorities. President Johnson " then asked Attorney General
James Speed whether the person involved in the assassina-
tion could be tried by a military court or must he be tried
before a civil court. The Attorney General rendered an opin-
ion pointing out that under the laws of war arising from the
law of nations the military authorities under the constitu-
tion had jurisdiction to try and execute secret enemies of
the country according to the laws of war and that Booth
and his associates were secret active public enemies. Mr.
Speed also said:
"The fact that the civil courts are open does not affect the right
of the military tribunal to hold as a prisoner and try. The civil courts
have no more right to prevent the military, in time of war, from
trying an offender against the laws of war, than they have a right
to interfere with and prevent a battle. . . .My conclusion, there-
45 Trial of the Conspirators, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 17. A copy of Presi-
dent Johnson's letter of May 1, 1865, ordering a military commission.
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fore, is that if the persons who are charged with the assassination
of the President committed the deed as public enemies, as I believe
they did, and whether they did or not is a question to be decided by
the tribunal before which they are tried, they not only can, but ought
to be tried before a military tribunal. If the persons charged have
offended against the laws of war, it would be as palpably wrong for
the military to hand them over to the civil courts, as it would be
wrong in a civil court to convict a man of murder who had in time of
war, killed another in battle." 46
On May 1, 1865, President Johnson, relying on the opinion
of the Attorney General, ordered a military commission to
be convoked to try the persons implicated in the murder of
President Lincoln, in the attempted assassination of the
Honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State, and in an
alleged conspiracy to assassinate other officers of the Fed-
eral Government at Washington, D. C. At the outset the
accused claimed that the military commission had no juris-
diction under the Constitution as the civil courts were open
and functioning at the time and that they were entitled to
a trial by jury. The Military Commission ignored that ar-
gument on the ground that a military crime was involved,
that the jurisdiction of the military was supreme, and that
the provision relating to jury trial had no application in
time of war. After a trial of seven weeks, the Military Tri-
bunal found the defendants guilty and sentenced four of
them to Fort Jefferson (Dry Tortugas) in Florida and four
of them to be hanged. On July 7th, 1865, the three men
and one woman were executed in Washington, D. C.47 Major
Birkhimer, in discussing the jurisdiction of the civil and
military authorities and upholding the view that the mili-
46 Trial of the Conspirators, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 409. In De Hart's
"Military Law," (edition of 1863), p. 143, is the following quotation from the
opinion of the attorney general, in May, 1839, on the jurisdiction of a court-
martial to proceed against an offender while a prosecution is Rending aganist
him before a court of criminal jurisdiction for the same offence: "I can feel no
hesitation in saying, (says the attorney general) that until he shall be discharged
from the prosecution pending before the civil tribunal, no court-martial can be
held upon him. Any such interference would be to place the military above the
civil authority, which is wholly inadmissable in our government."
47 Trial of the Conspirators, op, cit. supra note 1, at pp. 248, 249, 250.
See a detailed report of the trial by Ben Perley Poore, Boston, 1865, 3 Vols.
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tary did not act in subordination to the civil power while
aiding the civil magistracy of the District of Columbia to
exercise their vocations as usual, states: "The latter branch
of the subject was perhaps best illustrated by the hold the
military retained of jurisdiction of military offences, with-
out regard to the civil aspect of the case, as in the trial, con-
viction, and execution of the conspirators against the lives
of the President and members of the cabinet in 1865, al-
though at the time the war was over, and civil courts were
open for the trial of causes properly presented." 48
In passing it should be noticed that on July 7th, 1865, the
morning of the day set for the executions a petition for writ
of habeas corpus was filed in behalf of Mary E. Surratt by
her counsel before Judge Andrew Wylie of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. Judge Wylie ordered the
writ to issue as prayed, returnable before the Criminal Court
of the District of Columbia at ten o'clock of the same day.
At half-past eleven o'clock on the same morning Major-
General Hancock, accompanied by Attorney-General Speed,
appeared before Judge Wylie in obedience to the writ and
explained that President Johnson had suspended the writ
of habeas corpus and ordered the judgment of the Military
Commission to be executed. The court ruled that it yielded
to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by the Presi-
dent of the United States.49 Such an impasse is virtually a
judicial bankruptcy and pyramids the power of one depart-
ment to a height incompatible with its normal stature. Mr.
Justice Davis of the Supreme Court of the United States,
referring in the Milligan case to the laws and usages of war,
a year later stated: ". . . they can never be applied to citi-
48 Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law, (3rd ed.), 1914,
Franklin Hudson Company, Kansas City, Mo., p. 480. In the light of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Millian case (supra note 30)
such a conclusion is practically explained away. Davis' Military Law, (2nd ed.),
1904. p. 311, states that the civil courts were not seriously interrupted in the
exercise of their judicial functions.
49 Trial of the Conspirators, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 250. For a special
study of the trial of Mary E. Surratt, see "The Judicial Murder of Mary E.
Surratt" by DeWitt, Baltimore, 1895.
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zens in States which have upheld the authority of the gov-
ernment, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed." 5o Justice Davis, in discussing the jurisdic-
tion of the military power, said:
"If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the Courts are actually closed,
and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law,
then on the theatre of active military operations where war really pre-
vails there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority
thus overthrown to preserve the safety of the army and society; and
as no power is left but the military it is allowed to govern by martial
rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the
rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after
the Courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial
rule can never exist where the Courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." 51
John H. Surratt, the son of Mary E. Surratt, who was
alleged to be one of Booth's accomplices fled from Washing-
ton to Canada and from there to Europe. He was brought
back to the United States the following year and tried for
the murder of President Lincoln by the criminal court for
the District of Columbia. The jury disagreed and John H.
Surratt was subsequently set free.52 If John Surratt had been
tried with the other defendants, by the military commis-
sion, undoubtedly his fate would have been similar to theirs.
If the Supreme Court of the United States had ruled on the
military trial of the Lincoln conspirators, it is interesting
to speculate on what the court would have decided. As the
trials of the Lincoln conspirators have been relegated to the
museum of legal history, the most charitable view is to con-
sider them the result of the hysteria of war.
50 Ex parte Milligan, op. cit supra note 30.
51 Ibid. See 2 Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 45, Godwin, Inc., N. Y.
1932.
52 Trial of John H. Surratt, Washington, D. C., 1867, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., 2 Vols.
After the jury disagreed Surratt was returned to Old Capitol Prison, from
which he was later released upon $25,000.00 bail. Upon arraignment for a new
trial, Surratt was discharged by the court, as the United States failed to over-
come the objection of defense counsel to proceeding on the indictment.
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CONCLUSION
The rule that a civilian is entitled to be tried by the civil
courts is as old as Magna Charta.53 The Petition of Right
in 1628 and the Bill of Rights in 1688 likewise confirm the
guaranties of civil liberties. The Declaration of Independ-
ence in 1776 submitted to a candid world that the King,
amongst other things, had affected to render the military
independent of, and superior to, the civil power; and de-
prived the colonists, in many cases, of the benefits of a
trial by jury. It is evident that if the Constitutional Con-
vention had not agreed to add a Bill of Rights to the Con-
stitution, it would not have been ratified. The guaranty of
a jury trial was provided for in the original document and
further safeguarded by the fifth and sixth amendments. In
a recent study of the making of the Constitution the devel-
opment of Art. III, section 2, clause 3, is shown by Mr.
Charles Warren, who concludes: ". . . and in this manner
the principle of jury trial in criminal cases was imbedded
and guaranteed forever."
The early common law recognized the right of trial by
the civil courts, even in time of war. In 1322 the rebel Earl
of Lancaster rebelled against King Edward II and amidst
the noise of battle the King convoked a court-martial and
tried him. The Earl was sentenced to death and executed.
Eight years later on petition of the Earl's brother to the new
monarch, King Edward III, the attainder of the Earl of
Lancaster was reversed on the ground that at the time of
his trial and sentence the civil courts were open.55 There is
an abundance of authority supporting the view that as long
as the civil courts are open a person is not to be tried by
the military authorities even though it is a time of war,
as in judgment of law it was said to be a time of peace. As
53 McKechnie, Magna Carta, Ch. 39, p. 375.
54 Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston 1928, Little, Brown,
and Company, p. 547. See Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, (8th Ed.), 1927,
Vol. 1, pp. 668, 671.
55 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 344, 499.
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a consequence of this doctrine the only time a civilian could
be legally tried by the military authorities, was when the
regular courts were closed or, as Coke said, "shut up." 56
The state trials record some instances of a disregard for the
forms of law and the irregular trials of civilians by other
than the regular courts. Such trials were denounced by the
people as a violation of their fundamental rights and his-
tory indicates the Bill of Rights in 1688 resulted in part
from the people demanding a restatement of the law with
specific emphasis on outlawing military trials. In England
civilians have not been subject to military trial while the
ordinary courts are open, even in time of war. In Ireland
and South Africa there are cases repudiating the English
rule. In the United States, since the adoption of the Con-
stitution, the principle has been recognized generally that
a civilian is not subject to military trial. During the War
of the Rebellion this rule was ignored but the decision in
Ex parte Milligan in 1866 restored the ancient landmarks.
One of the things that brought about the adoption of the
present Constitution was the assurance to the States that
a Bill of Rights would be added to it.57 The provision re-
lating to jury trial in the original document was thereupon
safeguarded by the fifth and sixth amendments. According
to the understanding of the people at that time, the Con-
stitution thereby assured one of a regular trial in the civil
courts and excluded military trials. In other words, the mili-
tary jurisdiction was made subservient to the civil power.
What the people understood at that time is a pretty good
idea of what was intended to be protected. If they properly
understood the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
56 Coke's First Institute, (3rd Ed.), 1633, p. 249, § 412. "And therefore when
the Courts of Justice be open, and the Judges and Ministers of the same may by
law protect men from wrong and violence, and distribute justice to all, i't is said
to be a time of peace. .... "
57 Elliot's Debates in the several State Conventions on the adoption of the
Federal Constitution, Second edition, in five volumes, Philadelphia, 1861.
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present Articles of War,58 would be unconstitutional in so
far as courts-marshal and military commissions are given
jurisdiction over civilians when the civil courts are open.
Such a result rests upon the doctrine announced by Chief
Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury v. Madison,9 that
acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution are void.
The fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
apply to civilians at all times (war and peace) if the civil
courts are open. 0
John W. Curran..
De Paul University, College of Law.
58 Federal Statutes, op. cit. supra note 2. In a recent case, Terry v. United
States, 2 Fed. Supp. 962 (1933), a citizen was tried before a general court-martial
established by virtue of the Articles of War. He had embezzled moneys of the
United States intended for military service and had presented a false claim
against the United States for payment. The military jurisdiction was assumed
because the citizen had committed an offense contrary to Article of War during
army service, but as he had received an honorable discharge before the military
authorities preferred charges, it was contended that the case was not within the
Articles of War. It was. also contended that the accused would be deprived of a
jury trial. Cushman, District Judge, ruled otherwise. In the light of previous
analysis such a decision seems unwarranted. Long ago, De Hart in his work on
Military Law, (New York, 1863), at page 35, said: "It must be borne in mind,
however, that in all such cases which may occur, the decision quoted goes only
to maintain the prosecution, if commenced before the time at which the prisoner
is entitled to claim his discharge. If once lawfully discharged from the service, he
could not afterwards be arrested, or held amenable to trial by a military court,
for a military offense committed during the period of his military service." In
other words, the prosecution should be in the civil courts. See 4 Minn. L. Rev. 79.
59 1 Cranch, 137 (1803).
60 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921). See 3 Wil-
loughby on Const. Law 1591 (2nd Ed. 1930), Baker, Voorhis & Co.; Burdick on
Law of Am. Constitution, p. 261, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.
